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Introduction
Poverty reduction must be the principal criterion against which
official aid is evaluated. Sustained poverty reduction can be
achieved in a number of  ways. One such way is sustained
economic growth. While growth is certainly not the most
equitable, and possibly not the most efficient, means of  poverty
reduction, it is certainly a necessary one. To this extent, it is
appropriate that the research has largely focused on the
effectiveness of  aid transfers in promoting growth. Another
strand of  the literature has focused on how aid is allocated among
developing countries. Rarely if  ever did these research areas
intersect, in that studies seeking to explain observed or prescribe
optimal inter-country aid allocations did not take into account
effectiveness issues and vice versa.
Collier and Dollar (1999, 2002) changed this state of  affairs
with their aid selectivity approach to inter-country aid allocation.
Building on the empirical work of  Burnside and Dollar (1997a,
1997b, 2000), which concluded that the effectiveness of  aid in
promoting growth depends on the policy regimes of  recipient
countries, Collier and Dollar derived poverty efficient inter-
recipient aid allocations. According to the prescriptive Collier
Dollar selectivity approach, optimal aid allocation favours
countries with high levels of  poverty, low per capita incomes and
sound policy regimes. Such allocations are considered poverty
efficient by maximising the number of  people pulled out of
poverty. Countries with unsound policy regimes receive less aid
in the CollierDollar selectivity approach as these regimes lessen
aids impact on growth and thus poverty reduction.
This BurnsideDollar and CollierDollar research has
spawned a number of  subsequent academic studies. All agree
with the fundamental thrust of  this research: that aid is effective
in promoting growth and, by implication, in poverty reduction.
This has proved to be a particularly robust conclusion, drawn
by practically all subsequent empirical studies of  aid and growth
(Collier and Dollar 1999, 2002; Svensson 1999; Collier and
Dehn 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Hansen and Tarp 2000,
2001; Lensink and Morrissey 2000; Lensink and White 2000,
2001; Dalgaard and Hansen 2001; Guillaumont and Chauvet
2001; Hudson and Mosley 2001; Lu and Ram 2001; Chauvet
and Guillaumont 2002; Dalgaard et al. 2002; Ram 2004). There
is also evidence that foreign aid has promoted growth in the
Pacific (Gounder 2001, 2002).
Ambiguity over the aidgrowth linkage, which persisted for
many decades, has in general been removed and the well-known
macro/micro paradox of  official aid is dead and buried.1  These
studies are yet to provide such clarity over the relevance of
recipient country policies for effectiveness, with many failing
to produce similar empirical results to those reported in the
BurnsideDollar studies. To this extent the BurnsideDollar
results remain a topic of  significant controversy. But it should
be remembered that this debate is largely over whether it is
possible, in the context of  the econometric analysis of  cross-
country (panel) data sets, to observe a link between aid
effectiveness and policy. It is not so much about the relevance
of  policies per se, there is rather a general acceptance among
researchers that better policies, however defined, should in all
probability result in more effective aid (Robinson and Tarp 2000;
Benyon 2001, 2002; Morrissey 2002; Collier 2002).2
There are, however, many other areas of  aid research in which
there is far more clarity. These areas have been the subject of
extensive research conducted over many decades and include
studies on public sector aspects of aid (including fungibility),
ex post and ex ante conditionality (including structural
adjustment), aid and the real exchange rate, the determinants
of  inter-country aid allocation and NGO effectiveness. In some
instances these agreements have been reached following the
availability of  better data sets and application of  more rigorous
research methods. There are also a number of  new areas of
research that have emerged. These include aid and conflict
prevention, aid and growth in post-conflict scenarios, aid and
governance, and allocating aid via non-traditional channels.
This paper surveys research on aid effectiveness. It updates
and extends the coverage of  Benyon (2001, 2002) and
McGillivray (2003, 2004) by looking inter alia at more recent
research on the contribution of  aid to growth. The overall focus
is on the relevance of  these issues for poverty-efficient aid, defined
as a pattern of  inter-recipient aid allocation that maximises
poverty reduction. It identifies a range of  poverty-reducing
criteria, in addition to policy, on which aid allocation or
selectivity might be based.
The paper is built on the recognition of  two key points.
The first is that effectiveness of  aid in promoting growth is in
theory contingent on a range of  factors in addition to policy,
such as conflict reduction, vulnerability mitigation, political
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stability and governance. The second recognition is that, more
importantly, the ultimate objective of  aid is poverty reduction
or, more broadly, the promotion of  human wellbeing. This is
made very clear in the adoption of  the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), which identify poverty reduction as the ultimate
objective of  development efforts. Fuelling growth is one of  a
number means by which this objective can be achieved.
This paper looks first at the general linkage between aid,
growth and poverty reduction. It examines new directions in
research on aid and growth, highlighting work on the relevance
of  shocks, structural vulnerability, post-conflict scenarios,
democracy, political instability and absorptive capacity. Secondly,
it attempts to establish a broader concept of  selectivity, by
distilling various strands of  argument presented in the preceding
section, and in doing so looks at a variety of  channels through
which aid might reduce poverty, and on which poverty-efficient
allocations might therefore be based. It is recognised, in
particular, that aid can and should aim to reduce poverty other
than by means that rely purely on growth per se.
Aidgrowthpoverty reduction linkages
While the research effort on aid, growth and policy is ongoing,
a number of  new directions on aid effectiveness have emerged.
The focus remains on aid and growth, but a number of  factors
in addition to policy are taken into account. Trade shocks and
aid effectiveness have been analysed in Collier and Dehn (2001).
Developing countries can be highly shock prone, and trade
shocks can have substantial adverse consequences for growth.3
Shocks are defined in terms of  changes in export prices. The
hypothesis is that aid can potentially cushion the adverse growth
effects of  negative export price shocks through providing a buffer
by reducing the proportionate and absolute change in foreign
currency inflows. These effects are modelled by inserting
additional variables into the standard Burnside and Dollar aid
growth model. Results obtained from estimating this model
indicate that increasing aid does appear to mitigate the adverse
growth effects of  trade shocks.
Structural vulnerability in recipient countries and its impact
on aid effectiveness is analysed in Guillaumont and Chauvet
(2001). They, too, propose and empirically estimate an
augmented BurnsideDollar type aidgrowth model. Structural
vulnerability is a function of  the size of  shocks faced by countries,
but also of  their exposure or susceptibility to these shocks. Two
types of  shocks are identified: trade and climatic (due to such
events as droughts, floods, cyclones and earthquakes). Trade
shocks were measured by the trend in the terms of  trade and in
an index of  the instability of  real export values. Climatic shocks
were measured or proxied statistically by an index of  agricultural
value added instability. These variables measure the size of  their
respective shocks. Country shock exposure to climatic factors
was measured by weighting the agricultural value added instability
index with the agricultural share of  GDP. Exposure to trade
shocks was estimated by adding the logarithm of population, as
a separate variable, to the growth model, on the assumed grounds
that big countries are less vulnerable to trade shocks than small
ones. These four vulnerability variables were aggregated to form
a weighted index and this index was then inserted into the aid
growth model both as a variable in its own right, but also through
its interaction with aid. Results obtained by empirical estimation
indicated that growth is lower in more vulnerable countries, but
that the impact of aid on growth was higher when vulnerability
was high.
Political instability and aid effectiveness has been analysed
by further augmenting the aidgrowth model with an index of
political instability (Chauvet and Guillaumont 2002). This index
is the weighted sum of  coups détat and regime changes, and is
intended to measure instability of  political elites or institutions.
This variable influences growth directly, but also via its
interaction with the level of  aid. As in Guillaumont and Chauvet
(2001), an index of vulnerability was included in the model.
Results indicated that aid effectiveness is negatively influenced
by the level of  political instability. Results also indicated that
aid is more effective in structurally vulnerable countries,
confirming the result of  Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001).
The impact of  aid on growth in post-conflict scenarios is
examined in Collier and Hoeffler (2002). They note that the
economic circumstances of  post-conflict countries can be
distinctive in many respects: the need to restore infrastructure
combined with a collapse of  domestic revenue can make aid
unusually productive and growth can be supranormal (Collier
1999). Offsetting this, though, is what Collier and Hoeffler
describe as a persistent high-corruption equilibrium since the
incentive for a reputation of  honesty is often disrupted during
civil war (Tirole 1992). Collier and Hoeffler empirically tested
whether aid is more effective in post-conflict scenarios by a series
of  augmentations to the Burnside and Dollar aidgrowth model.
Based on a range of  estimates, the results showed that aid is more
than twice as productive in post-conflict episodes for given policies;
that there is a temporary growth spurt of  approximately two
percentage points higher than otherwise during these episodes;
and that in the absence of  aid there would be no growth spurt.
The effect of  democracy on the aidgrowth nexus is
examined in Svensson (1999). Democratic institutions (such
as political parties, elected representatives, free speech and the
right to organise) should provide a recurrent and institutionalised
check on government power, encouraging governments to use
aid productively and preventing them from using it
unproductively. Thus, it is hypothesised that aid will have a
greater impact on growth the greater the degree of  democracy.
The degree of  democracy is measured using indicators of  political
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and civil rights from Freedom House and formed into an index.
In this aidgrowth model, democracy impacts directly on growth
and also via its interaction with aid. Results obtained from
estimating this model indicated that while democracy had no
significant direct impact on growth, the coefficient attached to
the interaction between aid and democracy was almost without
exception significant and positive. Svensson concluded,
therefore, that the growth impact of  aid was conditional upon
the degree of  democracy.4  Kosack (2003) also drew this
conclusion, but in the context of the impact of aid on the quality
of  life, the latter measured by the Human Development Index.
Aid transmission mechanisms, or channels through which
aid can potentially contribute to growth, are the focus of
Gomanee et al. (2002a). Aid can effect growth directly, but also
through its impact on investment, imports, public-sector fiscal
aggregates, and government policy. Conscious recognition of
these mechanisms has important implications for modelling the
aidgrowth relationship in order to avoid double counting the
impacts of  aid. Gomanee et al. tested for the presence of  the
aidinvestmentgrowth mechanism, finding strong evidence
that it existed. Morrissey (2002) suggested, on the basis of  this
result, that government policies can play an important role in
enhancing aid effectiveness through seeking to improve the
productivity of  investment. This also applies to the other
mechanisms. For example, policies aimed at improving the
productivity of  government expenditure should improve aids
impact on growth provided the aidfiscal aggregates mechanism
exists. This research is linked with the extensive and longstanding
literature on aid and public-sector fiscal behaviour, which
generally finds that aid is associated with increases in government
expenditure categories, including pro-poor expenditures, the
fungibility problem notwithstanding.5  Gomanee et al. (2002b)
look at aid and pro-poor expenditure directly, using the
abovementioned transmissions mechanisms approach, finding
that aid is associated with increases in these expenditures and,
in turn, improvements in welfare.
Diminishing returns to aid effectiveness have been examined
closely by most recent aidgrowth studies, through the inclusion
of  an aid-squared term in their models. This tests for non-linearity
in the aidgrowth relationship, with aid being positively related
to growth up to a certain level of  aid and negatively related
thereafter. The coefficient on the aid-squared term is consistently
negative and significant, indicating that there are diminishing
returns to aid effectiveness. This is a seemingly highly robust
finding, with almost all studies reporting such a relationship, with
negative returns setting in when the aid inflow reaches anywhere
between 15 and 45 per cent of  GDP. This has been interpreted as
indicating limited aid absorptive capacities, with recipient
governments being limited in the amounts of  aid they can use
effectively (Clemens and Radelet 2003).6
Aid selectivity: Towards a broader
concept?
A number of  key points emerge from the preceding discussion.
Regarding effectiveness, aid fundamentally works, but it is clear
that its impact differs across countries depending on the
conditions they face. It is agreed that policies do matter, or at
least potentially matter, for the effectiveness of  aid, although
there is ambiguity over whether this has been correctly observed
from empirical estimates of  aidgrowth models. Aid seems to
work better in post-conflict situations, in structurally vulnerable
countries (including those undergoing trade shocks), in
politically stable regimes and in countries with good governance
records, although there would appear to be diminishing returns
to its impact on growth.
What does this mean for poverty-efficient allocations? It
must be recognised that aid can reduce poverty through its
impact on growth, but that its effectiveness in promoting growth
varies according to a range of  factors. It must also be recognised
that aid can reduce poverty through other channels. A channel,
for which there is empirical support based on the literature
identified above, is aids impact on pro-poor public expenditure
(there will of  course be others).
Thus, there appears to be a reasonable case for augmenting
and extending the CollierDollar selectivity model, just as the
BurnsideDollar growth model has been augmented in
analysing aid and growth. Donors are well positioned to do
this, and to some extent have begun to do so through their own
allocation initiatives. The essence of  the augmentation would
appear to be relatively straightforward and emanates directly
from the findings of  the aidgrowth studies discussed above.
Aid should not only be allocated to countries with low per
capita incomes and large numbers of  people living in poverty
and with good policies, but also to poor countries in post-conflict
scenarios, to those which are structurally vulnerable, to those
which have democratic and politically stable regimes, and those
with broader good governance records. Based on the evidence
discussed above, this should lead to a greater impact on growth
and in turn on poverty reduction. Indicators used in the studies
discussed above provide the information on which such an
allocation can be based.7  Attaching weightings to these
indicators, as is required in a selectivity formula, should in
principle be based on scientific empirical research, however,
donors will in practice assign weightings based on field
experience, anecdotal evidence, intuition and political
considerations.
The extension to the CollierDollar selectivity approach is
more fundamental. Based on the recognition that there are many
other determinants of  poverty, it would at minimum involve
giving additional preference to those recipients who can translate
aid into increased pro-poor public expenditure or, more simply,
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those governments with high levels of pro-poor expenditure
on the assumption that the aid-pro-poor public expenditure
elasticity is the same across all countries (Collier and Dollar
adopt a similar assumption regarding an income-poverty
reduction elasticity). A way of  formally incorporating the
relevant variables and parameters into the CollierDollar the
selectivity model would need to be found. In the absence of
this, donors could simply add some indicator of  pro-poor
expenditure to a more general selectivity formula.
There is, however, the issue of  diminishing returns to aid,
presumably resulting from limited aid absorptive capacities. This
is a potentially serious issue if  selectivity results in significantly
increased aid to individual countries. A potential solution to
this problem is also a suggested solution to a possible
consequence of  basing aid allocation on policy regimes, that
being the denial of aid per se to countries with bad policies, and
possibly with high poverty incidence. Suggested by Collier
(2002), it involves bypassing recipient country governments and
allocating aid via in-country independent service authorities
(ISAs), which could include NGOs. This could be done not
only with countries with policies so bad that aid will be ineffective
in any developmental sense, but with other countries at levels
of  aid where diminishing returns are thought to set in. Not
only could this see aid being allocated to, and poverty being
reduced in, countries with bad policies, but it could also relax
possible absorptive capacity constraints. More generally, it would
seem reasonable to assume that a broadening of  the selectivity
concept, and allocating aid in non-traditional manners, such as
through ISAs, would see more aid go to the very poorest
countries. This would garner broader support for a policy of
selectivity among donors and the international development
community in general.
Notes
* This paper is based on McGillivray (2003), which was originally
presented at the Joint OECD DAC/Development Centre Aid
Experts Seminar at the OECD Headquarters, 10 March 2003.
Correspondence should be addressed to Professor Mark
McGillivray, World Institute for Development Economics
Research, United Nations University, Katajanokanlaituri 6 B,
00160 Helsinki, Finland; email: mark@wider.unu.edu
1. Easterly et al. (2003), and Hughes (2003) provide dissenting
views on aid effectiveness. The first of  these studies provide a valid
reminder that panel data econometrics can provide rather fragile
results, which should be treated with a healthy scepticism.
However, given the consensus of  the large body of  recent aid
effectiveness research, these views represent those of  a minority.
2.. Note that it is incorrect to conclude that, on the basis of  the
Burnside and Dollar studies, aid only works in countries with a
good policy environment. The correct interpretation is that
foreign aid is more effective in countries with better policy
environments. Aid is still effective at spurring growth in countries
with poorer policies, but by not as much as in countries with
better policy environments. Moreover, the studies do not examine
whether aid has an impact on the level of  policy.
3. See Collier, Gunning & Associates (1999) and Dehn (2001) for
further details.
4. An alternative interpretation is that the impact of  democracy on
growth is contingent on the level of  aid. This points to a more
general interpretation problem regarding the aid interaction
terms used in the aidgrowth literature in general.
5. The relevant literature is surveyed in McGillivray and Morrissey
(2001a). Recent studies falling within this literature include
Feyzioglu et al. (1998), Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998),
McGillivray and Ahmed (1999), Swaroop et al. (2000),
McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) McGillivray (2000) and
Mavrotas (2002).
6. Among the studies reporting diminishing returns are Collier
and Dollar (2002), Collier and Hoeffler (2002), Hansen and
Tarp (2000, 2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Hudson and
Mosley (2001), Lensink and White (2001) and Dalgaard et al.
(2002). Heller and Gupta (2002) provide a useful discussion of
this issue, along with the related problem of  Dutch Disease.
Note though that Gomanee et al. (2003), using a general
technique specifically designed to detect threshold effects,
struggle to find evidence of  such returns and therefore question
the inferences drawn by previous studies.
7. Kaufman and Kraay (2002), Kraay (2002), Birdsall et al.
(2002), DFID (2002) and IDA (2001), among many other
sources, provide a range of  additional indicators and discussions
of their use.
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